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COMMENTARY
MEDICINE AND LAW
The WHO Pandemic Influenza
Preparedness Framework:
A Milestone in Global Governance for Health
David P. Fidler, JD
Lawrence O. Gostin, JD
AFTER YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS, THEWORLDHEALTHOrganization (WHO) reached agreement on a pan-demic influenza preparedness (PIP) framework forthe sharing of influenza viruses and access to vac-
cines and other benefits in April 2011.1 The framework ad-
dresses a troubling controversy—should low- and middle-
income countries share influenza virus specimenswithWHO
without assurances that benefits derived from sharing will
be equitably distributed?
During the avian influenza A(H5N1) outbreaks in late
2006, Indonesia refused to share virus specimenswithWHO,
claiming it was unfair to give pharmaceutical companies ac-
cess. Industry would use viruses to patent vaccines and an-
tiviral medications that Indonesia could not afford. Indo-
nesia asserted sovereignty over viruses isolated within its
territory, grounded on the Convention on Biological Diver-
sity. Indonesia also argued that the 2005 InternationalHealth
Regulations did not require states to share H5N1 viruses.2
The international community feared that Indonesia’s re-
fusal to share would impede surveillance and response, par-
ticularly because Asia was the epicenter of the global H5N1
outbreak.3 Serious health and political repercussions could
result if states failed to cooperate when confronting a com-
mon threat.
In May 2007, WHO member states commenced negotia-
tions on virus and benefit sharing to strengthen influenza
surveillance and response.4 Negotiations in intergovern-
mentalmeetings5 and an open-endedworking group6 proved
difficult—the problems were complex and states had diver-
gent interests, particularly on intellectual property rights.7
The 2009 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic deepened devel-
oping-country mistrust because vaccines were not equita-
bly shared.8 In October 2010, Convention on Biological Di-
versity parties reasserted state sovereignty over biological
materials within their territories.9 Finally, after nearly 4 years
of arduous negotiations, WHO’s director-general an-
nounced the WHO pandemic framework on April 16, and
the World Health Assembly approved it in May.10
PIP Framework
Objective and Principles. The framework governs sharing
“H5N1andother influenza viruseswith humanpandemic po-
tential and the sharing of benefits,” but does not apply to sea-
sonal influenza or noninfluenza biological materials. It im-
proves preparedness through WHO’s Global Influenza
Surveillance and Response System (GISRS) by encouraging
states to share viruses and enhance equitable access to ben-
efits. Framework principles include sovereignty over biologi-
cal resources, virus and benefit sharing on an equal footing,
and financing mechanisms for equitable access to benefits.
Legal Status.The framework is not legally binding.WHO
did not exercise its constitutional authority to adopt inter-
national law, and it contains permissive language—eg,mem-
ber states “should” share viruses and benefits. The frame-
work uses standard agreements for laboratories and
manufacturers participating in GISRS, creating legal con-
sequences for contracting parties.
Virus-Sharing System. The framework facilitates shar-
ing viruses and genetic sequence data and creates a trace-
ability mechanism, supported by 2 standardmaterial trans-
fer agreements. The framework encourages member states
to share “PIP biological materials”—specimens containing
H5N1 or other influenza viruses with human pandemic po-
tential—with aWHOCollaborating Centre on Influenza or
WHO H5 Reference Laboratory. When member states pro-
vide PIP biological materials, they consent to transfer and
use of these materials within and outside GISRS, subject to
the applicable standard material transfer agreement. Mem-
ber states may share PIP biological materials with other en-
tities provided that they give the same materials to a GISRS
facility. Genetic sequence data “should be shared . . . with
the originating laboratory and among WHO GISRS labora-
tories.” The framework directs WHO’s director-general to
strengthen genetic sequence data sharing by addressing ac-
cess, transparency, and political sensitivity concerns.WHO
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must establish an influenza virus tracking mechanism to
monitor movement of PIP biological materials into, within,
and out of GISRS. The influenza virus tracking mechanism
creates transparency to ensure that virus transfer and use
conform to framework principles.
The standardmaterial transfer agreements govern PIP bio-
logical materials transfers within and outside GISRS. The
first standard material transfer agreement covers transfers
between GISRS laboratories recognized or designated by
WHO, requiring them to complywith terms of reference and
withWHOand national biosafety standards. This first agree-
ment encourages laboratories not to seek intellectual prop-
erty rights on PIP biological materials. The second agree-
ment applies to transfers from WHO to entities outside
GISRS, such as vaccine manufacturers.
Benefit-Sharing System.The benefit-sharing system con-
tains many components, but the most significant ones re-
quire industry to pay half of GISRS’s annual operating costs
and provide benefits under the second standard material
transfer agreement (eg, vaccine donations). These contri-
butions give industry access to PIP biological materials in
exchange for assisting developing countries. Although re-
quiring manufacturers to provide equity-enhancing ben-
efits, the framework does not direct developedmember states
to provide specific benefits for developing countries (eg, vac-
cine donations).
Governance and Review. The World Health Assembly,
the WHO director-general, and an advisory group estab-
lished during the negotiations will oversee the framework’s
implementation. The independent advisory group “will pro-
vide evidence-based reporting, assessment and recommen-
dations.”WHOwill review the framework in 2016, and the
World Health Assembly will consider revisions in 2017.
Value of the PIP Framework
The framework seeks to strengthen pandemic influenza
surveillance and response while enhancing global equity.
Although the framework emphasizes the norm of sharing
viruses, it does not create legally binding obligations on
virus sharing. During the H5N1 and H1N1 crises, all states
shared viruses, except for Indonesia’s H5N1 refusals. The
framework reinforces a global norm but does not alter the
status quo. Genetic sequence data sharing also does not
represent a major shift, evidenced by the WHO director-
general’s obligation to address obstacles to sharing these
data. The framework’s most progressive reform for surveil-
lance and response is increased transparency of virus
transfers through the influenza virus tracking mechanism
and standard material transfer agreements, which bolsters
GISRS legitimacy.
The framework’s greatest accomplishment for equity is
to require industry contributions to GISRS’ operating costs
and through benefits provided under the second standard
material transfer agreement. Private-sector contributionswill
benefit developing countries by increasing access to tech-
nologies and capacity-building resources. However, private-
sector acquiescence reflects the framework’s avoidance of
intellectual property right disputes that complicated the ne-
gotiations. The framework’smost glaring omission is the ab-
sence of even “soft” norms encouraging developed coun-
tries to make specific equity-enhancing contributions to
developing countries, such as donating portions of pur-
chased vaccine.
The framework is a landmark in global governance for
health, representing the first international agreement on in-
fluenza virus and benefit sharing. The framework, how-
ever, reflects compromises that could jeopardize more eq-
uitable allocation of benefits in a future pandemic.
Implementing innovative global governance strategies is of-
ten frustrating, underfunded, and inadequate.
The framework emerges as political and financial capital
for global health is decreasing.When the next pandemic oc-
curs, will the international community identify the threat
and deploy effective therapeutic technologies? Will scien-
tific research and innovations be shared more equitably?
Global cooperation and fair allocation of life-saving re-
sources are essential for an effective and humane response
to global health threats.
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